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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter based on the Order of 
Dismissal, dated June 18, 2002, and under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND APPELLATE REVIEW 
L STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Did the District Court err in granting Motions to Dismiss in favor of 
Defendants Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., David Toller and Ted K. Godfrey 
finding that Plaintiffs Linda Haymond and Melinda Lloyd have no standing or basis 
under Utah law for a right of action against the Defendants for alleged illegal attorney fee 
splitting practices. 
B. Did the District Court err in granting Motions to Dismiss in favor of 
Defendants Ted Godfrey, Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc. and David Toller finding 
that Plaintiff Linda Haymond has no standing or basis under Utah law for a right of 
action against the Defendants for alleged collection and retention of treble damages 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§7-15-1. 
II. APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issue of standing is primarily a legal question which appellate courts review 
for correctness. Kearns-Tribunes Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997) 
American Interstate Mortgage v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16, f 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
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III. LAWS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
The following statutory law and administrative law is of central importance to the 
appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 (pre and post 1999 versions); and 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 4-505 and 4-505.01. 
These laws are appended as part of the Addendum to Brief of the Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE 
The above-captioned lawsuit involves the efforts and practices of Defendants 
Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc. and David Toller (collectively referred to as 
"Bonneville") and their attorney Ted K. Godfrey ("Mr. Godfrey") in collecting debts, 
pursuant to Utah's Dishonored Instrument Act, Utah Code Ann. §§7-15-1 et seq. (1953 
as amended) ("Dishonored Instrument Act" or "Act"). The dishonored instruments which 
are the subject of this suit are checks issued by Plaintiffs Linda Haymond ("Ms. 
Haymond") and Melinda Lloyd ("Ms. Lloyd"). 
In the Winter of 2001, Ms. Haymond issued and "bounced" a check made payable 
to the Flower Patch. On behalf of the Flower Patch, Bonneville and its attorney Mr. 
Godfrey sought collection of the dishonored check by sending letters to Ms. Haymond, 
and by eventually filing suit in June 2001 seeking recovery of the value of the check, 
collection costs, attorney fees, and damages, as permitted under the Dishonored 
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Instrument Act. However, in October 2001, the suit against Ms. Haymond was 
voluntarily dismissed by Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey, resulting in Ms. Haymond not 
paying any attorney fees or collection damages to Mr. Godfrey or Bonneville. 
In the Spring of 1999, Ms. Lloyd issued and "bounced" a check made payable to 
Conoco. On behalf of Conoco, Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey sought collection of that 
dishonored check by sending letters to Ms. Lloyd and preparing suit pleadings as 
permitted under the Dishonored Instrument Act. In June of 1999, after being served with 
initial pleadings prepared by Mr. Godfrey, Ms. Lloyd paid $40.20 to Mr. Godfrey 
representing the amount of the bounced check and a service charge, and also paid 
$160.00 to Mr. Godfrey representing the costs of service of the pleadings and attorney 
fees. 
In this suit, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd claim that after seeking and collecting 
(with respect to Ms. Lloyd) attorney fees as permitted under the Dishonored Instrument 
Act as stated above, Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville engaged in an illegal attorney fee 
splitting scheme. They allege that the attorney fee splitting scheme consists of payments 
which Mr. Godfrey makes to Bonneville for lease of office space, maintenance of a group 
health insurance plan for Mr. Godfrey's employees and use of Bonneville's CUBS 
computer system. Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd claim that such payments amount to and 
are, in actuality, one-half of the attorney fees collected, and are an end run around Utah's 
rule prohibiting sharing of attorney fees. 
3 
Ms. Haymond also claims that Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey violated the 
Dishonored Instrument Act in seeking treble collection damages from Ms. Haymond. 
Ms. Haymond asserts that Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey retain the damages, in violation of 
Section 7-15-l(6)(b) and (7)(d) of the Act, rather than passing on the damages to the 
original payees of the dishonored instrument as required by the Act. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION AT THE 
DISTRICT COURT LEVEL 
On or about December 17, 2001, Ms. Lloyd and Ms. Haymond filed the above-
captioned lawsuit against Bonneville and Ted K. Godfrey alleging twenty two separate 
causes of action which concern the aforementioned two claims of alleged illegal attorney 
fee splitting practices and alleged wrongful collection and retention of treble damages. In 
their Complaint, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd seek certification of this suit as a class 
action for all Utah individuals who are debtors from which Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey 
attempted to and/or collected attorneys' fees that were allegedly illegally split, and 
allegedly attempted to and/or collected and retained treble damages. 
Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey were served and filed Answers to the Complaint. 
Shortly thereafter, Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey filed separate Motions to Dismiss 
asserting that Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd lack standing to sue them for alleged attorney 
fee splitting practices and wrongful collection and retention of treble damages. 
Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey asserted that even assuming the truth of the alleged wrongful 
conduct, which they vehemently deny, the Complaint allegations show that neither 
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Plaintiff suffer any distinct and palpable injury because Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville were 
authorized under the Dishonored Instrument Act to rightfully seek and collect attorney 
fees (collection only from Ms. Lloyd) and to rightfully seek treble damages from Ms. 
Haymond. Accordingly, neither Plaintiff could be injured from what allegedly happens 
to such funds after Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville rightfully sought and partially collected 
them. 
On June 3, 2002, Judge J. Dennis Frederick heard oral argument on the Motions to 
Dismiss and thereafter granted both Motions. Judge Frederick ruled that "Plaintiffs have 
no standing or basis under Utah law for a right of action against Defendants [for attorney 
fee splitting practices or collection of treble damages] as they allege in their Complaint." 
Order of Dismissal at 2; Brief of Appellant, Addendum; Record Index at p. 472. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Undisputed Facts Concerning Plaintiffs' Dishonored Checks. 
Plaintiff Linda Haymond 
1. On February 24, 2001, Plaintiff Linda Haymond wrote a check to the 
Flower Patch for $7.42, which was subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. See 
Complaint at H[ 9-10 and Exhibit "A"; Record Index at p. 3, 33. 
2. Ms. Haymond's dishonored check was referred to Bonneville Billing & 
Collection, Inc. for collection on behalf of the Flower Patch, and Bonneville retained 
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attorney Defendant Ted K. Godfrey to collect the check. See Complaint at f][ 11-12; 
Record Index at 3. 
3. On April 13, 2001, Mr. Godfrey sent a notice to Ms. Haymond regarding 
collection of the dishonored check. See Complaint at <J[ 13 and Exhibit "B" of the 
Complaint; Record Index at pp. 3 and 34. 
4. On June 13, 2001, Mr. Godfrey had Ms. Haymond served with a Summons 
and Complaint suing Ms. Haymond for collection of the dishonored check and other 
costs, fees and damages pursuant to the Utah Dishonored Instruments Act. See 
Complaint, at f 14 and Exhibit "C"; Record Index at pp. 3 and 35. 
5. Ms. Haymond retained Plaintiffs' counsel, Lester Perry ("Mr. Perry"), to 
defend her. Mr. Perry's defense included seeking discovery of information and 
documents regarding Mr. Godfrey's collection of attorney fees, alleged splitting of fees 
between Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville and collection of damages. See Complaint at ff 
16-22; Record Index at pp. 3-5. 
6. On October 3, 2001, Bonneville voluntarily filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
suit against Ms. Haymond with prejudice. See Complaint, at f 25 and Exhibit "I"; 
Record Index at pp. 5 and 49. 
7. Ms. Haymond opposed Bonneville's Motion to Dismiss and filed a Motion 
to Amend Answer proposing to amend her Answer to alleged wrongdoing by Bonneville 
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in collection of the dishonored check. See Complaint at Exhibit "J"; Record Index at pp. 
52-53. 
8. After consideration of the parties' motions, the trial court granted 
Bonneville's Motion to Dismiss and denied Ms. Haymond's Motion to Amend Answer as 
moot, stating "there is nothing to defend against. It [] seems axiomatic that plaintiff 
cannot be made to prosecute a matter it does not wish to pursue." Complaint at Exhibit 
"J"; Record Index at p. 53. 
9. In relation to the collection of the dishonored check, Ms. Haymond sent a 
cashier's check in the amount of $28.00 to the Flower Patch, the original payee. Ms. 
Haymond never made any payment of damages, costs or attorney fees to Mr. Godfrey or 
Bonneville. 
Plaintiff Melanie Lloyd 
10. On April 16, 1999, Plaintiff Melanie Lloyd wrote a check to Conoco, Inc. 
in the amount of 19.90, which was subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. See 
Complaint at ff 27-28; Record Index at p. 6. 
11. Ms. Lloyd's dishonored check was referred to Bonneville for collection and 
Bonneville sent Ms. Lloyd two notices in April and May of 1999 demanding payment of 
the dishonored check and service charges. It appears Ms. Lloyd did not respond to those 
notices. See Complaint at <H 29-30, and Exhibits "K" and "L" to the Complaint; Record 
Index at pp. 6 and 55-57. 
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12. Thereafter in June 1999, Bonneville retained Mr. Godfrey to continue 
efforts in collection of the dishonored check from Ms. Lloyd. Mr. Godfrey prepared a 
Complaint and Summons for collection of the dishonored check seeking recovery of the 
check amount, service charge, costs and attorney fees. The Complaint and Summons 
were served on Ms. Lloyd on June 13, 1999. See Complaint at % 31 and Exhibit MM"; 
Record Index at pp. 6 and 58-60. 
13. On June 14, 1999, Ms. Lloyd responded to service of the Complaint and 
Summons by having a cashiers check issued to Ted Godfrey in the amount of $40.20, 
representing the amount of the dishonored check and service charge (plus interest). See 
id. at 1 32 and Exhibit "N"; Record Index at pp. 6 and 61. 
14. On June 25, 1999, Ms. Lloyd also issued a check to Ted Godfrey in the 
amount of $160.00, representing payment of attorney's fees of $150.00, and cost of 
service of the Summons and Complaint of $10.00. See Complaint at ff 33 and 34 and 
Exhibit "O"; see also Answer of Ted K. Godfrey at f 11; Record Index at pp. 6, 61a1 and 
84. 
15. Ms. Lloyd made no other payment for damages, costs or fees for 
discontinuance of Bonneville's suit against her for the dishonored check. 
1
 Exhibit "O" of the Complaint did not receive a number within the Record Index. It is 
located between Record Index page 61 and 62. For clarification, Bonneville refers to 
Exhibit "O" as Record Index page 61a. 
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B. Facts Concerning This Suit 
16. On or about December 17, 2001, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd filed the 
above-captioned lawsuit against Defendants Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey. See 
Complaint; Record Index pp. 1-63. 
17. In their Complaint, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd generally allege that in 
relation to the efforts of collecting dishonored checks, Defendants engaged in two 
wrongful and/or illegal practices: 1) the splitting of attorney fees between Mr. Godfrey 
and Bonneville; and 2) the retention of treble damage monies which monies should only 
be collected for and passed onto the original payees of the dishonored checks. See 
Complaint at fR 35-51; Record Index at pp. 6-10. 
18. Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd filed their Complaint seeking certification of 
this lawsuit as a class action for all Utah individuals who are debtors from which 
Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey attempted to and/or collected monies for dishonored checks 
under Utah's Dishonored Instrument Act. See Complaint at f l 52-62; Record Index at 
pp. 10-13. 
1. Splitting of Attorney's Fees Claim 
19. In their Complaint, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd allege that prior to 1994, 
all attorney fees received by Defendants from collection actions were split equally 
between Bonneville and its attorneys. In 1994, the Utah State Bar Association issued an 
opinion to collection attorneys stating that splitting attorney fees between attorneys and 
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collection agencies is a breach of the attorney rules of ethics and professional conduct. 
See Complaint at ff 36-37; Record Index at pp. 6-7. 
20. Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd acknowledge in their Complaint that after 
1994, attorneys representing Bonneville retained 100% of the attorney fees collected 
from debtors. See Complaint at f 38; Record Index at p. 7. 
21. Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd assert that after 1994 Mr. Godfrey and other 
attorneys representing Bonneville began paying Bonneville fees for rent, maintenance of 
a group health insurance plan, and use of Bonneville's computer system (CUBS system) 
for collection matters. See Complaint at f 38; Record Index at p. 7. 
22. Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd claim that the payments for rent, health 
insurance and use of the computer system are an amount equal to 50% of the attorney 
fees collected by Bonneville's attorneys and is an end run around Utah law prohibiting 
the splitting of attorney fees. See Complaint at f][ 38 - 44; Record Index at p. 7-8. 
23. Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd assert that the attorney fees splitting scheme 
violates Utah's Dishonored Instrument Act permitting collection of "reasonable attorney 
fees", and violates Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. See Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 [1999 & Post 1999] and Utah R. Jud. 
Admin. 4-505 &4-505.01 found at Brief of Appellants; Appendum ; see also Complaint 
at f j 63-82; Record Index at pp. 13-18. 
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24. Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd assert causes of action for the claim of illegal 
attorney fees splitting based on the foregoing statutory and administrative law, as well as 
causes of action of: Restitution - Mistake of Fact, Restitution - Mistake of Law, 
Restitution - Tortious Payment of Money, Unjust Enrichment, Wrongful Collection, 
Liability for Intended Consequences, Fraud, Fraudulent Non-Disclosure, Negligent 
Misrepresentation and Civil Conspiracy. See Complaint at fj[ 63-118; Record Index at 
pp. 13-23. 
2. Collection Damages Claim 
25. Ms. Haymond also alleges in the Complaint that Bonneville and Mr. 
Godfrey engaged in the practice of wrongfully attempting to and collecting treble 
damages from Utah check writers, and then retaining such collection damage monies 
rather than passing it onto the original payee of the check. See Complaint at f][ 46-48; 
119-165; Record Index at pp. 23-30. 
26. Subsection (7)(b) of Section 7-15-1 provides that the issuer of a check is 
liable to the holder for damages equal to the greater of "(I) $100.00 or (II) triple the check 
amount." Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-l(7)(b)(iv) (Supp. 2001). Subsection (7)(d) of 7-15-1 
then expressly restricts the retention of those collection damages solely to the original 
payee of the check: 
(d) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (7)(b), all amounts 
charged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(iv) shall be paid 
to and be the property of the original payee of the check. 
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(ii) A person who is not the original payee may not retain 
any amounts charged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(iv). 
(iii) The original payee of the check may not contract for a 
person to retain any amounts charged or collected under 
Subsection (7)(b)(iv). 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-l(7)(d) (Supp. 2001); see Complaint at ffl 46, 54, 119. 
27. Plaintiff Haymond alleges in the Complaint the following claim of 
wrongful conduct: 
47. Based upon best information and belief, Bonneville 
and its attorneys were not hired by the merchant to whom Ms. 
Haymond wrote her check, The Flower Patch, to collect such 
damages. Notwithstanding this fact, Bonneville and Mr. 
Godfrey attempted to collect such damages with the intent of 
keeping these damages for themselves. Ms. Haymond did not 
pay these damages because she hired an attorney to protect 
her from the attempts of Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey to 
collect these damages. 
Complaint at <H 47; Record Index at p. 9. 
28. Ms. Haymond asserts causes of action for the alleged wrongful retention of 
collection damages based on Section 7-15-1 of the Dishonored Instrument Act, as well as 
Mistake of Fact, Restitution - Mistake of Law, Restitution - Tortious Payment of Money, 
Unjust Enrichment, Wrongful Collection, Liability for Intended Consequences, Fraud, 
Fraudulent Non-Disclosure, Negligent Misrepresentation and Civil Conspiracy. See id. 
at ffl 119-165; Record Index at pp. 23-30. 
C. Prior Review And Determination Of Alleged Attorney 
Fee Splitting Practice By Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville. 
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29. In 2000, prior to filing the above-captioned suit, Plaintiffs1 attorney, Mr. 
Perry, filed an informal complaint with the Utah State Bar Office of Professional 
Misconduct alleging that Defendants Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville engaged in attorneys' 
fee splitting practices in violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. See Letter 
from Lester A. Perry to Utah State Bar, July 6, 2000; Exhibit "6" to Bonneville's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss . . . ; Record Index at pp. 190-220. 
30. The Office of Professional Conduct reviewed and investigated Mr. Perry's 
complaint. On May 18, 2001, counsel from the Office of Professional Conduct issued a 
determination dismissing Mr. Perry's Complaint. The determination provides: 
You have alleged that Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville 
have a fee splitting arrangement by Mr. Godfrey making 
excessive payments for the use of the CUBS system when the 
attorneys were not previously billed for the use of this system. 
Mr. Godfrey states that he does (sic) [not] engage in 
any fee splitting with Bonneville and that Bonneville is paid 
for the lease, equipment, insurance and use of the CUBS 
system. 
The evidence is insufficient to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Godfrey has violated 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. You have not established 
that Mr. Godfrey is fee splitting because of the large 
payments to Bonneville for the use of the CUBS system. 
Bonneville is not prohibited from charging its attorneys more 
than its cost for the use of the system. 
Accordingly, this matter must be dismissed. We 
nevertheless thank you for bringing this matter to our 
attention. Your concerns aid the OPC in monitoring the 
professional conduct of attorneys in Utah. 
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Letter from Renee Spooner to Lester Perry, dated May 18, 2001; Exhibit "7" to 
Bonneville's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss . . . ; Record Index at pp. 
211-12. 
31. Mr. Perry attempted to appeal the Office of Professional Conduct's decision 
to the Utah State Bar Association's Ethics and Discipline Committee, however the appeal 
was dismissed as being untimely. See Ruling, dated June 21, 2001; Exhibit "8" to 
Bonneville's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss . . . ; Record Index at pp. 
213-15.2 
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In addition to have having filed a Complaint with the Office of Professional Conduct, 
Plaintiffs' counsel has filed within the past six years two other suits against Bonneville in 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah on behalf of plaintiff/debtors who 
alleged the same claims as Ms. Lloyd and Ms. Haymond of illegal attorney fee splitting 
practices. See Pickering et al. v. Bonneville Billing and Collections et al, Civil No. 1-95-
CV-125-B ("Pickering"); Twila Heard v. Bonneville Billing And Collections, Inc. Civil 
No. 2:97-CV-445C ("Heard"). In those prior cases, the district court judges addressed 
standing of the plaintiffs to sue for alleged illegal attorney fee splitting practices, and 
Judges Benson and Campbell found that plaintiffs lacked standing if attorneys performed 
work of collecting the debt. Mr. Perry appealed the Heard case and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed Judge Campbell's ruling. The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found: 
As the district court noted, Ms. Heard did not allege in her 
complaint the attorneys' fees were too high or unconscionable 
or that the attorney did not do any work to justify the 
statutory award. Indeed, Ms. Heard paid the amount 
demanded before any judgment was entered on Bonneville's 
stated complaint. What Bonneville's attorney did with the 
statutory fees may violate state ethical rules. How that 
injures this plaintiff, however eludes us. It is the 
fundamental deficiency of Ms. Heard's stake in the 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
To prove standing under Utah law, a plaintiff must show that he/she has suffered 
"a distinct and palpable injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the 
dispute." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). In rare instances, however, 
Utah courts find standing without injury if a plaintiff is the most appropriate plaintiff to 
bring the claims, and/or a plaintiff raises issues of such public importance that they ought 
to be decided to further public interest. See State of Utah v. L.A.W., 2000 UT 79; 12 
P.3d 80 (Utah 2000) (citing Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 
(Utah 1985)). 
Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd allege that Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey have 
violated the Dishonored Instrument Act and Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 of the Utah Rules 
of Judicial Administration by engaging in illegal attorney fee splitting practices and 
wrongful collection and retention of treble damages. While Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd 
assert the foregoing claims, neither of them have suffered any distinct and palpable injury 
from or caused by the alleged wrongful conduct to meet the traditional test for standing to 
file suit. 
outcome of the fee-splitting issue which defeats her 
standing. We therefore cannot conclude that the district 
court erred in dismissing her second claim of unlawful and 
unethical fee-splitting on the ground she lacked standing. 
Heard v. Bonneville, 216 F.3d 1087 (Table), 2000 WL 825721 **5 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(emphasis added); Record Index at pp. 188-89. 
15 
Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd admit in their Complaint allegations that as a result 
of their own conduct of issuing bad checks, Mr. Godfrey, as an attorney, and Bonneville, 
as a collection agency, were entitled under the Dishonored Instrument Act to seek and 
collect reasonable attorney fees for Mr. Godfrey's work and treble damages to be retained 
by the original payee of the checks. Ms. Haymond's and Ms. Lloyd's only claims of 
wrongdoing are in what happens to the attorney fees and damages after they are paid to 
Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville (payment actually being only made by Ms. Lloyd). How 
those fees and damages are later used and by whom is none of Ms. Haymond's and Ms. 
Lloyd's business and does not injure them. 
Moreover, neither the Dishonored Instrument Act, the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration nor any other law, rule or regulation provide a legal basis for Ms. 
Haymond and Ms. Lloyd to sue over funds properly sought and collected from them 
under the Dishonored Instrument Act. Therefore, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd have not 
sustained injury and do not meet the first and traditional test for standing to sue. 
Lastly, there are no facts or law which provide a basis for the Court to invoke 
Utah's other two tests to grant standing. The claims of illegal attorney fees splitting 
practice and wrongful retention of collection damages do not involve issues of great 
public importance and there are other potential plaintiffs who have a more direct and 
greater interest than Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd in the outcome of the case. 
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Accordingly, the Court should affirm Judge Frederick's ruling dismissing this suit in its 
entirety for lack standing to sue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
MS. HAYMOND AND MS. LLOYD LACK STANDING 
TO SUE BONNEVILLE AND MR. GODFREY. 
As a general proposition under Utah law, "the right to commence a legal 
proceeding depends on the plaintiffs suffering an injury to a legally protected right for 
which the law provides a remedy. Absent such a showing, there is no right to complain 
in the courts." Stromquist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 1982). In legal parlance, 
the foregoing concept is known as standing to sue. Standing "operates as a gatekeeper to 
the courthouse, allowing only those cases that are fit for judicial resolution." Aldrich, 
Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. D.E.S., 878 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Utah courts have developed a three-step test for determining whether a plaintiff 
has standing to sue: 
A party has standing if any one of the three criteria is met: (1) 
the interests of the parties are adverse, and the party seeking 
relief has a legally protectible interest in the controversy; (2) 
no one has a greater interest than that party and the issue is 
unlikely to be raised at all if standing is denied; or (3) the 
issues raised by the party are of great public importance and 
ought to be judicially resolved. 
State of Utah v. L.A.W., 2000 UT 79, 12 P.3d 80 (Utah 2000) (citing Kennecott Corp. v. 
Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985)) (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 
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1145, 1150-51 (Utah 1983)). The first step of the test acknowledges and conforms to the 
traditional standing criteria of showing the plaintiffs "real and personal interest in the 
dispute", and the second and third steps recognize the court's power in exceptional 
circumstances to "grant standing where matters of great public interest and societal 
impact are concerned." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150. As the following analysis 
demonstrates, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd do not and cannot meet any of the three steps 
of the standing test for either of their claims against Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey and the 
Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of their case for lack of standing. 
II. 
MS. HAYMONDS AND MS. LLOYD'S CLAIMS FAIL 
UTAH'S THREE-PART TEST FOR STANDING. 
A. First Step: Traditional Test For Standing. 
Under the first step of the standing test, a plaintiff must "show that he suffered 
some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the 
legal dispute." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148. A mere allegation of an adverse impact is not 
sufficient. There must be a causal relationship between the injury to plaintiff, the alleged 
illegal activity of the defendant and the relief requested. See id. at 1150; see also York v. 
Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679, 680 (Utah 1986). The 
courts, therefore, must make a determination "whether proof of such a causal relationship 
is difficult or impossible and whether the relief requested is substantially likely to redress 
the injury claimed." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150. 
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In this case, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd complain that in collecting dishonored 
checks Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey have allegedly engaged in illegal attorney fee 
splitting practices and wrongful collection and retention of treble damages in violation of 
the Utah Dishonored Instruments Act and Utah Rules of Judicial Administration . Ms. 
Haymond and Ms. Lloyd can neither show that they have sustained any injury causally 
related to Defendants' wrongful conduct, even assuming that such conduct occurred, nor 
can they show that they have a personal stake in the outcome of the suit. 
1. Claims of Illegal Splitting of Attorney Fees 
First, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd have not been injured by alleged attorney fees 
splitting practices. The Utah Dishonored Instruments Act expressly provides for 
recovery of "reasonable attorneys fees" in collecting dishonored checks. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7-15-1(7) (Supp. 2001). Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd admit that Mr. Godfrey 
performed work (preparing correspondence and pleadings) in pursuing collection of their 
dishonored checks, therefore entitling him to seek attorney fees under the Dishonored 
Instrument Act. See Statement of Facts at *H 3-4, 12. Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd 
further acknowledge that the $150.00 amount of attorney fees collected from Ms. Lloyd 
comports with and is an amount expressly allowed as attorney fees for default judgments 
of $700.00 or less under Rule 4-505.01 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. See id. at 
f 23, 25. Therefore, the fee collected by Mr. Godfrey from Ms. Lloyd was a reasonable 
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attorney fee amount. Lastly, Ms. Lloyd admits that she paid the attorney fees to Mr. 
Godfrey and he retained them. See id. at f 14, 20.3 
Based on the foregoing admitted facts, how can Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd 
have suffered injury and have a personal stake in the issue when the fees and amount 
collected from Ms. Lloyd are consistent with the law permitting such collection.4 
Furthermore, how can they obtain relief and/or redress for subsequent illegal distribution 
of fees which were properly collected from them. They owed the funds and have no right 
or business in complaining about how the funds are later used. Ms. Haymond's and Ms. 
Lloyd's situation is no different than if a defendant, who pays attorney fees as part of a 
judgment in a civil rights case, later sues the plaintiffs attorney for the manner in which 
he/she used or distributed the attorney fees. Such civil rights defendant, like Ms. 
Haymond and Ms. Lloyd, has no personal stake in the outcome of how or when those 
fees are used. Ms. Haymond or Ms. Lloyd have not suffered harm which is causally 
related to Bonneville's and Mr. Godfrey's alleged splitting of attorney fees. 
2. Claim of Wrongful Collection and Retention of Treble Damages. 
Ms. Haymond never paid any attorney fees to Mr. Godfrey and therefore has even less 
basis for claim of injury and standing than Ms. Lloyd. 
4
 That was the question asked by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Heard v. 
Bonneville case and it found that the plaintiffs did not have a stake in the outcome of the 
fee splitting issue. See Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at f 31 n.2. This Court 
should consider this thoughtful reasoning of the federal bench and likewise find that Ms. 
Haymond and Ms. Lloyd have no stake in the alleged attorney fee splitting practices and 
lack standing to sue. 
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In addition to claiming illegal attorney fee splitting practices, Plaintiff Linda 
Haymond asserts a claim that Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey have engaged in wrongful 
collection and retention of treble damages in violation of the Dishonored Instrument Act. 
Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey deny these claims, but even assuming they are true, she has 
not been injured by such acts. 
The Dishonored Instrument Act provides that issuers of checks can be held liable 
for damages if their checks are dishonored, and the damages can be equal to the greater 
of $50.00 (presuit) $100.00 (post-suit) or "triple the check amount." Utah Code Ann. §§ 
7-15-l(6)(a)(iii); and (7)(b)(iv); Brief of Appellants, Addendum (Post 1999 Version). 
The Act, however, restricts the retention of those damage monies to the original payee of 
the dishonored check. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-15-l(6)(b) and (7)(d); Brief of 
Appellants, Addendum (Post 1999 Version).5 
While Ms. Haymond asserts her claim for wrongful collection and retention of 
treble damages against Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey, she admits and acknowledges that 
she never paid collection damages or any monies to either defendant as a result of their 
5
 Section 7-15-l(7)(d) provides: 
(d) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (7)(b), all amounts charged or collected 
under Subsection (7)(b)(iv) shall be paid to and be the property of the 
original payee of the check. 
(ii) A person who is not the original payee may not retain any amounts 
charged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(iv). 
(iii) The original payee of the check may not contract for a person to 
retain any amounts charged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(iv). 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-l(7)(d) (Supp. 2001). 
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efforts of collecting the dishonored check she issued to the Flower Patch. Bonneville 
voluntarily dismissed the suit it brought against Ms. Haymond under the Dishonored 
Instrument Act prior to obtaining any order or judgment for payment of damages. See 
Statement of Material Facts at ff 6-9. Since Plaintiff Haymond paid no damages to 
Defendants and no damages were ever retained by Bonneville or Mr. Godfrey, Ms. 
Haymond could not have and did not suffer any injury whatsoever and has no personal 
stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. 
Even if Ms. Haymond had paid collection damages under Section 7-15-1, she still 
would not suffer any harm or injury from Bonneville or Mr. Godfrey's alleged wrongful 
retention of damages. The claim is no different than the circumstance of Plaintiffs' claim 
of illegal attorney fees splitting practice. Ms. Haymond acknowledges that Section 7-15-
1 of Utah's Dishonored Instrument Act provides that issuers of dishonored checks are 
subject to liability for damages of $100.00 or treble the amount of the dishonored check. 
See Statement of Material Facts at ff 27-29. Plaintiff Haymond was subject to liability 
for treble damages in issuing a dishonored check. However, how those treble damages 
are later distributed or retained is of no injury to or business of Ms. Haymond. Like the 
alleged splitting of attorney fees, Ms. Haymond would have no "concrete, particularized 
injury" from having paid damage monies under Section 7-15-1 which Defendants 
thereafter allegedly retained for themselves. 
22 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that neither Ms. Haymond nor Ms. Lloyd can 
show that they sustained injury from illegal attorney fee splitting practices or wrongful 
retention of treble damages allegedly committed by Bonneville or Mr. Godfrey; and that 
neither of them have a personal stake in the outcome in a legal dispute regarding such 
wrongful conduct. Therefore, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd fail to meet the requirements 
of the first and traditional test for standing to sue. 
B. Second Step: No Other Entity With Standing And Greater Interest In 
Outcome Of The Case. 
If a plaintiff does not have standing under the first step of the standing test, Utah 
courts will analyze the second step of the standing test, which is whether there are 
potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest in the issues who can more adequately 
litigate the issues. If there are no such potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest and 
"the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if the plaintiff is denied standing", the courts will 
grant standing. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). In the present case, 
there are potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest in the issues of illegal attorney 
fees splitting practices and wrongful retention of collection damages than Ms. Haymond 
and Ms. Lloyd, such that the second standing test is not met. 
1. Claim of Illegal Attorney Fee Splitting Practice. 
While Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd cast their attorney fee splitting practice claim 
as violations the Utah Dishonored Instrument Act and Rules 4-505.01 of the Utah 
Judicial Administration Act, they acknowledge in their Complaint that their claims are in 
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actuality claims governed by Rule 5.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct which 
prohibits sharing of legal fees. See Complaint at f 75B; Record Index at 16. Rule 5.4 of 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states that "[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share 
legal fees with a nonlawyer." Utah R. Prof. Cond. 5.4. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct do not create a basis for civil liability or 
give rise to a private cause of action against those violating the rules. See Archuleta v. 
Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 413-414 (Utah 1998). Rather, the Rules of Professional Conduct 
are to be administered and overseen by the Utah State Bar in reviewing conduct of 
attorneys. Given that the Rules of Professional Conduct are not a basis for private civil 
liability, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd have no right of action and have no standing to 
sue Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville for violation of Rule 5.4 for alleged attorneys' fees 
splitting practices. 
However, there is an entity which is a potential plaintiff and does have standing to 
bring a cause of action for alleged attorney fee splitting practices under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. That entity is the Utah State Bar Association Office of 
Professional Conduct. Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct are prosecuted by 
the Utah State Bar through the Office of Professional Conduct. See Pendleton v. Utah 
State Bar, 2000 UT 96 f 9; 16 P.3d 1230, 1232 (Utah 2000). Under the Utah Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability, the Office of Professional Conduct reviews complaints 
of attorney misconduct, and if meritorious files suit against attorneys prosecuting them 
24 
for violations of the Rules, including Rule 5.4 regarding splitting of attorney fees. 
Therefore, the Office of Professional Conduct is a party which has standing to sue for 
attorney fee splitting practice claims and is a party with "a more direct interest in the 
issues who can more adequately litigate the issues." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150. 
Indeed, in 2000, Plaintiffs' counsel, Lester Perry, used the foregoing procedures 
and forum of the Office of Professional Conduct to bring an informal complaint against 
Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville for the exact claim of attorney fee splitting practice now 
before the Court. See Statement of Material Facts at ffl 29-31. The Office of 
Professional Conduct investigated the complaint of alleged attorney fee splitting practice 
against Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville and concluded that the complaint was unmeritorious. 
See id. at f 40. Mr. Perry attempted to appeal the Office's decision to the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar Association, but his appeal was untimely. 
Unhappy with the foregoing result, this suit was filed in hope that the parties and 
the Court would ignore Ms. Haymond's and Ms. Lloyd's lack of standing to sue, and 
permit an end-run around the interest and right of the Office of Professional Conduct to 
investigate and prosecute claims of attorney misconduct. Accordingly, the Office of 
Professional Conduct is an entity which has a greater interest than Ms. Haymond and Ms. 
Lloyd in the outcome of claims for alleged attorney fees splitting practices, and therefore 
Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd do not meet the second step of the standing test. 
2. Claim of Wrongful Collection and Retention of Treble Damages 
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For the claim of wrongful collection and retention of treble damages, there are 
several potential plaintiffs with a more direct and greater interest in the issue than Ms. 
Haymond. First, the original payees to the dishonored checks which are entitled to the 
collection damages under the Dishonored Instrument Act are potential plaintiffs with a 
more direct interest in seeking relief from Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey than Ms. 
Haymond. See Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-l(7)(d). The original payees are those entities 
which are allegedly deprived of the collection damage monies and, unlike Ms. Haymond 
who was never be entitled to such damage monies, they may be entitled to request and 
seek relief for the alleged wrongful conduct. 
Second, the Utah State Division of Corporations and Commerce is a potential 
plaintiff with a more direct interest than Ms. Haymond in the issue of whether Bonneville 
and Mr. Godfrey are allegedly retaining the collection damage awards in violation of 
Section 7-15-1(6) and (7). The Division of Corporations and Commerce governs the 
registration and bonding of collection agencies under Title 12 of the Utah Code. In 
having such authority over collection agencies, the Division could seek declaratory or 
injunctive relief against Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey for conducting collection efforts in 
violation of the Dishonored Instrument Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 12-1-1 et seq. (2001). 
Third, although Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey dispute the standing of any check 
writers to seek relief for wrongful retention of collection damages, as shown above, those 
check writers who actually paid collection damages to Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey 
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through settlement or judgment have a more direct and greater interest in the outcome of 
the case than Ms. Haymond. Those check writers at least paid damages to Bonneville 
and Mr. Godfrey unlike Ms. Haymond. Ms. Haymond may not assert the alleged 
jeopardy or injury of those check writers who paid collection damages in order to confer 
standing on her own claim. York v. Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials, 
714 P.2d 679, 680 (Utah 1986) ("Plaintiff may not allege jeopardy or injury to others in 
order to confer standing upon his own claims.").6 Since there are several potential 
plaintiffs with a more direct and greater interest in the outcome of the case than Plaintiff 
Haymond, the second step of the standing test is not met. 
C. Third Step: Issue of Great Public Importance. 
Lastly, if a plaintiff does not have standing under the first or second steps of the 
standing test, Utah courts will grant standing if "the issues raised by the party are of great 
public importance and ought to be judicially resolved." State of Utah v. L.A.W., 2000 
UT 79 I 12, 12 P.3d 80, 83 (Utah 2000) (finding that State of Utah had standing to raise 
issue of parental presumption in divorce custody proceeding over non-parent in which 
6
 Additionally, courts, who have addressed the standing of representational plaintiffs in 
class action suits, find that representational plaintiffs who lack individual standing when 
suit is filed cannot maintain a class action suit for those class member who might have 
standing to sue. See Policastro v. Stelk, 780 So.2d 989 (Fla. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2001) ("It 
is clear that no class action may proceed until there is a named plaintiff with standing to 
represent the class."); Pyles v. Johnson, 758 N.E.2d 1182, 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist 
2001) ("The class membership prerequisite requires only that the 'the representative have 
proper standing."); The M.D. Anderson Cancer Center v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704 (Texas 
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parent/father had previously lost custody in an adjudication of neglect case); see also 
State of Utah v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1379 (Utah 1996) (finding that convicted felon 
lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of statutory scheme codifying insanity 
defense as defendant did not raise an issue that "is so important that that we [the court] 
must decide it in the absence of a more appropriate litigant."). The issue of great public 
importance is determined on a case-by-case basis examining several factors: 1) whether 
the issue is of sufficient weight to be judicially resolved; 2) whether the issue is not more 
properly addressed by the other branches of government; and 3) whether their are 
potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest in the particular issue. See Jenkins, 675 
P.2d at 1150-51. 
In Jenkins, this Court examined the standing of a taxpayer to challenge the issue of 
constitutionality of educators serving in the Utah Legislature, where the plaintiff taxpayer 
did not live in a school district which employed an educator who was also in the 
Legislature. The taxpayer claimed standing based on the great public importance of the 
challenged issue. The Court denied standing making the following finding: 
Jenkins further requests that we grant him standing under the 
rationale that he raises questions of great public interest and 
societal impact. We need not address that issue. Since 
Jenkins' claim for standing on this issue is predicated solely 
on the grounds of its public importance, we will not grant him 
standing when the pleadings reveal other potential plaintiffs 
with a more direct interest in this particular questions. 
2001) ("[I]f the named plaintiff lacks individual standing, the court should dismiss the 
entire suit for want of jurisdiction."). 
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Jenkins1 interest as a resident of the state of Utah is certainly 
less direct than the interest of the residents of the school 
districts which employs these individuals or the legislative 
districts from which they are elected. We need not and do not 
decide here whether residents of those areas would have 
standing to bring this complaint. We do find, however, that 
Jenkins1 interest is less direct than the interest of those living 
in the relevant school districts or legislative districts. 
Therefore, we will not invoke the standing doctrine of "great 
public interest and societal impact" to consider his request for 
standing. 
Id. at 1151. 
Applying the foregoing rationale of the Jenkins case to the present case 
demonstrates that this Court should not invoke the standing doctrine of great public 
importance to grant Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd standing to pursue claims of illegal 
attorney fee splitting practice and wrongful retention and collection of treble damages 
against Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey. Like the facts in Jenkins and Mace, and as 
previously shown, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd have a less direct interest in the issue of 
attorney fee splitting practices than the interest of a potential plaintiff of the Utah State 
Bar Association Office of Professional Conduct. Ms. Haymond also has a less direct 
interest in the issue of collection and retention of treble damages than the original payees 
of the dishonored check and the Utah State Division of Corporations and Commerce. 
Furthermore, the claims of fee splitting and wrongful retention of treble damages 
are not so important of issues that the Court should decide these issues in the absence of 
the more appropriate litigants. Attorney fee splitting and retention of treble collection 
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damages are not issues which have great public interest or societal impact. Rather the 
claims at issue in this case have a limited impact and effect on society, concerning the 
ethical and business conduct of attorneys and collection agencies. 
Consequently, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd do not meet the third step or any 
other step of the standing test. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the lower court's 
dismissal of Ms. Haymond's and Ms. Lloyd's claims against Bonneville and Ms. Godfrey 
for lack of standing. 
II. 
MS. HAYMOND AND MS. LLOYD HAVE NO REMEDY 
UNDER UTAH LAW FOR BONNEVILLE'S AND MR. GODFREY'S 
ALLEGED ATTORNEY FEE SPLITTING PRACTICES 
AND WRONGFUL RETENTION OF TREBLE DAMAGES 
In addition to the fact that Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd cannot show injury or 
meet Utah's three-step standing test, they also cannot show that Utah law provides a 
remedy to them for Bonneville's and Mr. Godfrey's alleged attorney's fee splitting scheme 
and alleged wrongful retention of treble damages. In their Appellate Brief, rather than 
analyzing the standing issue, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd primarily concentrate their 
efforts on arguing that Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey have violated Section 7-15-1 of the 
Dishonored Instrument Act and Rule 4-505.01 of the Rules of Judicial Administration in 
splitting attorney fees and retaining treble damages. See Appellate Brief at 21-27. 
7
 In their argument attempting to show that Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey violated the 
Dishonored Instrument Act by allegedly splitting attorney fees, Ms. Haymond and Ms. 
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However, in making that argument, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd completely ignore the 
fact that neither Section 7-15-1 nor Rules 4-505.01 provide any basis for civil liability or 
a private cause of action to enforce their provisions. 
Utah courts do not generally recognize or grant "a private right of action based 
upon state law, absent some specific direction from the Legislature." Broadbent v. Board 
of Education of Cache County School Dist., 910 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. of App. 
1996) (teacher did not have private right of action to enforce provisions of Educator 
Evaluation Act). The statute or other administrative law must provide or indicate in some 
way that the Legislature intended to create a private remedy for the courts to recognize 
such a civil remedy. Id. at 1278-1280 see also Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 414 
(Utah 1998) ("Utah Rules of Professional Conduct are not designed to create a basis for 
civil liability."); Millner v. Elmer Fox And Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974) (stating 
that where criminal statute did not provide a private right of action, such matter and 
Lloyd claim that the Act does not allow a collection agency to collect collection costs, 
other than a service fee. See Appellate Brief at pp. 19, 22. Just recently, this Court found 
that such interpretation of the Dishonored Instrument Act is wrong. In Checkrite 
Recovery Serv. v. King, 2002 UT 76 (Utah July 30, 2002), the Utah Supreme Court 
interpreted the Dishonored Instrument Act finding that the Act's phrase "all costs of 
collection including all court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees" must include costs of 
collection which are no longer limited to $20. Id. at f 6. This Court stated: "It would be 
anomalous to construed the statutory scheme to allow recovery of collection costs early 
in the collection process, but deny recovery of them when a civil action is necessitated 
with its attendant increase in time devoted to the collection effort." Id. Accordingly, 
while unrelated to the standing issue, the Checkrite case demonstrates that Ms. 
Haymond's and Ms. Lloyd's analysis of the Dishonored Instrument Act is faulty. 
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remedy is "best left to the legislature."). If there is no provision or indication that the 
Legislature intended to create a private remedy, Utah courts will not and cannot invent a 
remedy. 
Neither the Dishonored Instrument Act nor Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration provide a basis for a private right of action against 
Bonneville and/or Mr. Godfrey. The Dishonored Instrument Act establishes the 
procedures and rights of check holder to seek recovery from issuers of dishonored 
checks, like Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd. The Act is completely silent as to permitting 
a cause of action for debtors against collection agencies and/or attorneys who allegedly 
violate it provisions. Likewise, Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 simply establish general 
procedures for determining the amount of attorney fee awards and say nothing about 
violation of and remedy for violation of their provisions. Since neither the Dishonored 
Instrument Act nor Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 provide a private right of action, Ms. 
Haymond and Ms. Lloyd have no right to seek remedy for Bonneville's and Mr. 
Godfrey's alleged attorney fees splitting scheme and alleged wrongful collection of triple 
damages. 
The lack of a private cause of action under the Dishonored Instrument Act and 
Rule 4.505.01 demonstrates why the Hawaii case of Fuller v. Pacific Medical 
Collections, Inc., 891 P.2d 300 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995), which Ms. Haymond and Ms. 
Lloyd rely on in their Appellate Brief, is distinguishable from this case. See Appellate 
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Brief at p. 28-30. In Fuller, the plaintiffs/debtors challenged the retention of attorney's 
fees by debt collection agencies claiming that such conduct violated Hawaii's Revised 
Statutes ("HRS") Chapter 443B which govern collection agencies. The debt collection 
agencies filed a motion to dismiss claiming that plaintiffs had no standing because 
violations of Chapter 443B can only be enforced by Hawaii's Director of Commerce and 
Consumer Affairs. The trial court granted the debt collections agencies motion and the 
plaintiffs appealed. Fuller, 891 P.2d at 303-304 
The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii reversed the trial court's 
determination finding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue based on a specific provision 
of statute. The court found that HRS § 480-13(b) expressly grants a consumer the right 
to sue for damages "who is injured by any unfair or deceptive act or practice forbidden or 
declared unlawful by Section 480-2". Id. at 305. 
This case is in stark contrast to the facts and circumstances of the Fuller case. In 
the present case, neither the Dishonored Instrument Act nor Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 
provide for a private cause of action to Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd. Accordingly, the 
Fuller case is distinguishable and shows that in this case Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd do 
not have standing because they have not suffered an injury to a legally 
protected right for which Utah law provides a remedy.8 
o 
Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd claim number common law causes of action against 
Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey (e.g. mistake of fact, unjust enrichment). While some of the 
causes of action are recognized under Utah's common law as a general proposition, when 
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III. 
MS. HAYMOND AND MS. LLOYD ARE NOT DENIED 
THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A DAY 
IN COURT BY DISMISSING THEIR CASE FOR LACK 
OF STANDING. 
Finally, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd assert that by granting dismissal of their 
case against Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey, the trial court denied them their right to a day 
in court, and violated Article I Sections 7 and 11 of the Utah Constitution, which provide 
due process and open courts guarantees. Ms. Haymond's and Ms. Lloyd's constitutional 
argument fails for two reasons. 
First, Ms. Haymond's and Ms. Lloyd's constitutional arguments are raised for the 
first time on appeal. Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd did not argue in their memoranda 
opposing Defendants' Motions to Dismiss that dismissal of their claim violates their due 
process rights and/or the open courts rule, nor were such arguments raised by their 
counsel at oral argument. See Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss of 
applied to the claims made by Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd, they still do not state a 
claim for relief and demonstrate their lack of standing to sue Bonneville and Mr. 
Godfrey. While Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd complain that Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey 
wrongfully split attorney fees and wrongfully retained treble damages, they acknowledge 
that Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey were entitled to seek attorney fees and treble damages 
under Section 7-15-1 and Rule 4-505.01 and complied with those laws in obtaining the 
attorneys fees from Ms. Lloyd. Utah's common law does not recognize a right of action 
in a person from which attorneys fees and damages were rightfully sought and collected 
to seek redress for the way in which those fees and damages are later used and/or 
disbursed. Accordingly, as with their claims under the Dishonored Instrument Act and 
Rules of Judicial Administration, Plaintiffs have no remedy under Utah's common law for 
their claims against Defendants. 
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Bonneville Billing & Collections and David Toller; Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss Ted K. Godfrey; see also Transcript of Hearing Occurring June 3, 
2002; Record Index at 480 (pp. 1-14). Issues, claims and defenses "not raised by parties 
at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal." Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 
1022 (Utah 1996) (court declined to address arguments involving constitutional 
protections as the arguments were not raised before the lower court); see also Bangerter 
v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) ("It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not 
raised by the parties in the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal."). Since 
Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd did not make their constitutional arguments before the 
lower court, claiming violation of their due process rights and the open courts rule, the 
Court should not consider those arguments now. 
Second, even if the Court considers Ms. Haymond's and Ms. Lloyd's argument that 
the dismissal violates their constitutional rights to due process and open courts, that 
argument fails on the merits. Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees 
Utahns their due process rights providing that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law." Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. Article I, Section 11 
guarantees and provides the right of open courts: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
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this State, by himself or counsel any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11. This Court has recently stated that the due process and open 
courts clauses of Article I of the Utah Constitution both guarantee that "litigants will have 
[their] day in court." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6 f 38, 44 P.3d 663, 675 
(Utah 2002). The "constitutional right to a day in court is the 'right and opportunity, in a 
judicial tribunal, to litigate a claim, seek relief, or defend one's rights.'" Id. citing Black's 
Law Dictionary 402 (7th ed. 1999). 
Implicit in the due process and open courts guarantees, however, is the limitation 
or requirement that the individual have a viable claim and that there is a justiciable 
controversy between litigants: 
[T]he open courts provision guarantees litigants access to the 
courts i.e., a day in court, affording them the opportunity to 
litigate any justiciable controversy. However, that right is 
limited to those individuals who actually have a viable claim 
because the right is inextricably connected with that claim. 
Applied Medical Technologies v. Eames, 2002 UT 18 f 16, 44 P.3d 699, 702 (Utah 
2002). Further, requiring a viable claim necessarily requires that the individuals will 
have sustained some injury and have standing to sue. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 11 ("All 
courts shall be open to, and every person, "for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law . . . . " ) . '"[SJtanding is 
implicit in the open courts provision' because it 'contemplates access to the courts only 
for those litigants suffering an injury.'" Met-Rx USA, Inc. v. Shipman, 62 S.W.3d 807, 
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809 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Texas Ass'n. of Bus, v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 
S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). Accordingly, standing to sue is a necessary prerequisite 
for the protections afforded by the due process and open courts provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. 
As shown above, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd do not have standing to sue 
Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey for alleged illegal attorney fee splitting practice and 
wrongful retention of treble damages. Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd have not sustained 
any injury from conduct of Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey, assuming Plaintiffs' allegations 
are true. Since Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd do not have standing, their rights of due 
process and open courts, protected by the Utah Constitution, are not violated by dismissal 
of their claims. Consequently, the Court should affirm the lower court's dismissal of Ms. 
Haymond's and Ms. Lloyd's action. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that neither Plaintiff Linda Haymond nor 
Plaintiff Melinda Lloyd have suffered any injury that gives them a personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute they pursue, namely: whether Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey 
allegedly engaged in illegal splitting of attorney fees and wrongful retention of collection 
of treble damages in relation to collecting dishonored checks. Nor can Ms. Haymond and 
Ms. Lloyd demonstrate that they have standing under the second and third steps of Utah's 
standing test to permit this case to be heard and heard as a class action suit against 
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Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the lower court's 
dismissal of Ms. Haymond's and Ms. Lloyd's suit in its entirety as Ms. Haymond and Ms. 
Lloyd lack standing to bring claims against Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey. 
DATED this * p day of December, 2002. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Rebetca L. Hill 
Attorneys for Defendants Bonneville 
Billing & Collections, Inc. and David Toller 
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